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UNIVERSITÀ DI BOLOGNA - FACOLTÀ DI ECONOMIA 
LAUREA MAGISTRALIS IN ECONOMICS 
 
Corporate Governance (Finance I.C.) 
Area: Finance & Economics  
Winter 2011 
 
 
Instructor: Marco Bigelli 
   
Office:  Dipartimento di Scienze Aziendali 
  Via Capo di Lucca, 34 
  3rd floor 
Phone: 051 2098060              
Email:  marco.bigelli@unibo.it 
Web:  http://www2.sa.unibo.it/docenti/marco.bigelli/didattica.html 
 http://www.unibo.it/SitoWebDocente/default.htm?UPN=marco.bigelli%40unibo.it 
 
 
     
Office hours: please, check my web site at: 
http://www.unibo.it/SitoWebDocente/default.htm?NRMODE=Published&TabControl1=Tab
Avvisi&upn=marco.bigelli%40unibo.it&news=5970 
 
 
 
Required knowledge  
Basic financial knowledge of financial instruments, present values of cash flows, organization of 
financial markets and corporations. 
 
Objectives 
The course tries to cover in a comparative way the main models of corporate governance and 
their specific problems. It focuses also on shareholders protection and expropriation and on 
some EU directives aimed to integrate European Financial Markets.  
 
 
Program (and relative reading material) 
1. Course introduction: International corporate governance models: Bank oriented (Japan, 
Germany, continental Europe) versus market oriented (US, UK). The anglosaxon model 
and the "public company".  Agency costs from separation of ownership and control in a 
public company. External solutions: market for products, market for managers, market for 
corporate control.  (Slides 1, REQ1, REQ2) 
2. Agency costs from separation of ownership and control in a public company. Internal 
solutions: board of directors, debt, monitoring by institutional investors, incentive 
schemes.  (Slides 2, REQ1, REQ2) 
3. The US Enron scandal and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Slides 3, OPT1) 
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4. The Continental European Model: ownership-control separation through “legal devices". 
Major effects of Ownership/Control separation through legal devices. (Slides 4, OPT2) 
5. Investors’ protection around the world. The Law and Finance approach and its critics. 
Legal and non-legal tools for shareholder protection. (Slides 5, OPT-REQ1, OPT-REQ2, 
REQ3) 
6. Corporate governance reforms and investors’ protection in Italy. Self-expropriation in 
dual class-voting: a case study approach. (Slides 6, REQ4, REQ5) 
7. The value of the voting right in dual class firms: theory and evidence (Slides 7, OPT-REQ3) 
8. The Financial Services Action Plan and major EU directives. Economics of Insider trading 
and the EU Market Abuse directive (Slides 8, OPT3) 
9. Economics of Takeovers and the EU takeover directive (Slides 9, REQ6, OPT4).  
10. The Nabisco takeover and the movie "Barbarians at the gates" 
 
Reading material availability 
All reading material and pdf copies of the slides are available and free downloadable at the 
following URL: 
http://www2.sa.unibo.it/docenti/marco.bigelli/didattica.html 
 
Required reading material (REQ) 
o All Slides used in class (numbered according to the lectures’ numbers) 
o REQ1: Denis D. K. and J.J. McConnell, 2003, “International corporate governance”, Journal 
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38, 1-36.  
o REQ2: Schleifer and R. W. Vishny, 1997, “A Survey of Corporate Governance“, Journal of 
Finance 52, 737-783. 
o REQ3: Enriques L. and P. Volpin, 2007, “Corporate Governance Reforms in Continental 
Europe“, Journal of Economic Perspectives 21, 117-140. 
o REQ4: Barbi M., M. Bigelli, S. Mengoli, “Italian Corporate Governance”, in “The Handbook 
of International Corporate Governance: A Definitive Guide”, 2nd edition May 2009, The 
Institute of Directors, Kogan Page, London. 
o REQ5: M. Bigelli, S. Mengoli (2011), Self-expropriations versus self-interests in dual class 
voting”, forthcoming on Financial Management (downloadable from 
http://ssrn.com/author=90881) 
o REQ6: Burkart M. and F. Panunzi, 2006, Takeovers, ECGI Working paper n. 118-2006. 
 
 
 
Extra required reading material for non-attending students taking the exam in the official 
exam sessions (January-February and September)  rather than at the end of the course 
(OPT-REQ) 
o OPT-REQ1: La porta et al. (1998), “Law and Finance”, Journal of Political Economy, 106, 
1113-1155. 
o OPT-REQ2: Rajan R. G. and L. Zingales (2003), “The great reversals: the politics of financial 
developments in the twentieth century”,  Journal of Financial Economics 69, 5-50. 
o OPT-REQ3 Adams, R., and D. Ferreira, 2008, “One share, one vote: The empirical 
evidence”, Review of Finance, 12, 51-91.  
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Optional reading material (OPT) –Not required but helpful to expand some topics - 
o OPT1: Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
o OPT2: Bigelli M., V. Mehrotra and R. Rau, 2012, “Why are shareholders not paid to give up 
their voting privileges? Unique evidence from Italy”, forthcoming on Journal of Corporate 
Finance. 
o OPT3: Enriques L. and M. Gatti (2006), EC Reforms of Corporate Governance and Capital 
Markets Law: Do they Tackle Insiders’Opportunism?, working paper. 
o OPT4: EU Takeover directive 
 
 
Class attendance 
Students are strongly advised to attend all the lectures. The course is designed to stimulate class 
interaction and discussion. Most of the insights will emerge during class rather than from 
reading the required teaching material. A deep understanding of the slides and suggested papers 
can only be achieved through the class participation.  
 
Final exam and grading for attending students 
Final exam 
The evaluation of attending students will we made by a final exam at the end of the course. The 
exam will be indicatively made of 20 multiple choices (20/30 points) and some small exercises 
(for a total of 10/30 points) and will last 1 hour.  
 
Re-take exams  
Re-take exams will take place during the official sessions of June and September, at the end of the 
integrated course. The corporate governance re-take exam will be made of three open questions 
and students will have to study also the following study material: 
 
o OPT-REQ1: La porta et al. (1998), “Law and Finance”, Journal of Political Economy, 106, 
1113-1155. 
o OPT-REQ2: Rajan R. G. and L. Zingales (2003), “The great reversals: the politics of financial 
developments in the twentieth century”,  Journal of Financial Economics 69, 5-50. 
o OPT-REQ3 Adams, R., and D. Ferreira, 2008, “One share, one vote: The empirical 
evidence”, Review of Finance, 12, 51-91.  
 
Exam registration policy for the whole integrated exam of Corporate Finance 
• The final grade for the integrated course (Corporate finance) will be computed as an 
arithmetic average of the two separate modules.  
• All positive grades of the integrated course will be automatically registered within two 
weeks from grading unless students ask not to proceed. 
 
